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The study of the marginal scenario of the theorem of lemons under the total failure of the 
market of used cars – nobody buys, but everybody gets taxi – shifts the analysis of the 
equilibrium down from the level of cars to the level of mileage, because the market of used cars 
stays under the pressure of options whether to buy or to lease and whether to rent a car or to get 
taxi. The buying of a car with regard to the demand for mileage represents the purchase of input 
for home production where driving like gardening and pets’ care can provide a direct utility but 
is also something one can purchase on the market. The equilibrium price of a mile equalizes the 
willingness to pay of shoppers, consumers with zero search&maintenance costs, and the 
willingness to accept or to sell of searchers, consumers with positive search&maintenance costs. 
The practice to sell rights for queue jumping and illegal taxicab operations illustrate the 
arbitrage between shoppers’ willingness to pay and searchers’ willingness to accept.  
The analysis of choice between a good high-mileage car and a bad aged low-mileage car 
goes beyond the traditional considerations on status purchases and describes the phenomenon of 
the consumers’ willingness to take care of good cars. The willingness to take care increases 
after-the-purchase costs of ownership above the level of standard technological maintenance 
costs. As a result, after-the-purchase costs of ownership per mile for high-mileage cars become 
greater than for aged low-mileage cars. The willingness to take care of big-ticket items supports 
the demand and sellers of good cars do not quit the market. The willingness to take care 
redistributes used cars, i.e., assets for the home production of miles, for its more efficient use 
and cleans up the way to the Coase theorem. 
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Introduction 
Almost fifty years passed after George Akerlof published his famous paper “The Market 
for lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. Five years after the appearance of 
the article the wave of regulatory “lemon” laws started with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 
And in 2001 George Akerlof received the Nobel Memorial Prize for his research on asymmetric 
information. 
His verdict to markets under the asymmetry of information has become legendary: 
“For it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the 
medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no 
market exists at all” (Akerlof 1970, p. 490).  
However, in real life used-car markets haven’t broken down and, as some authors pointed 
out, they could survive even without “lemon” legislation (Anderson 2001). It seems that real life 
has rejected the theorem of lemons. However, the model represents the brilliant illustration of 
                                            
1 The paper was presented at the 68th Congress of the Association Française des Sciences Économiques, Orléans, 
June 17-19, 2019. 
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Arrow’s idea that “a certain amount of lack of realism in the assumptions of a model is no 
argument against its value” (Arrow 1963, p.944). Indeed, the theoretical model of the demand 
for used cars gave birth to the new trend in economic thought. Today we can speak about the 
“economics of lemons” that covers different applied fields – from education to pharmaceuticals 
– where the asymmetry of information significantly changes human behavior (Cooper 2007, 
Katz 2007). 
The Akerlof model also has not yet exhausted its possibilities in microeconomics. The 
hypothetical question what happens with the market under the total asymmetry of information 
and mistrust goes beyond the field of the pure theoretical analysis and becomes crucial also for 
the applied economics.  
The hypothetical marginal scenario of the total market failure discovers the limits to the 
“theorem of lemons”. When the mistrust dominates the market, nobody buys cars. And 
everybody takes taxi. The price for taxi rises and it becomes reasonable for taxi drivers to buy 
good cars. Moreover, it also becomes rational for potential buyers of good cars to pay expertize 
costs for taxi drivers in order to choose a good car. Therefore, the demand for good cars is 
restored, now at the new price level. 
However, when we take into account the price for a taxi not only at the hypothetical 
margin but also in everyday options - to buy or to lease a car and to rent a car or to get taxi – we 
should shift the focus of the analysis from the demand for cars to the demand for mileage.2 
Going down to the level of attributes (Lancaster 1966), we can say that under the basic 
assumptions of the Akerlof model consumers don’t choose between a good car and a bad car. 
Their choice is concentrated on the expected mileage. And they really meet there the 
prerequisites of the Akerlof model – the risk of the odometer fraud that motivates search; low-
mileage aged bad cars and the high-mileage good cars.  
 
Part I. Quantity to be purchased 
We can derive the Cobb-Douglass utility function U(Q,H)=Q(L+S)/THH/T from the 
allocation of the time horizon T between labor (L) and leisure (H) with respect to search (S) for 
mileage  in order to get the optimal trade-off between consumption of miles Q and leisure H. 
Here we presuppose that search represents any activity, which reduces the purchase price and it 
displays both labor and leisure in the time horizon like an ice squeezes out whiskey and soda 
from the glass under the Archimedes’ principle3: 
L+ S +H =T ; (1.1)
(−∂L / ∂S)+ (−∂H / ∂S) =1; (1.2)
dH (S) = dS
∂H
∂S
= −dS
H
T
;→
∂H
∂S
= −
H
T
; (1.3)
∂L
∂S
=
H −T
T
= −
L+ S
T
(1.4)
L+ S
T
+
H
T
=1 (1.5)
 
The optimal trade-off between consumption of miles Q and leisure H can be constrained 
by the equation of the marginal values of search, based on the famous Sigler’s equation (Stigler 
1961). If we substitute units of search in this equation by the time of search S itself we can get 
the constraint for the utility function that represents the equality of marginal monetary values of 
search: 
                                            
2 The problem of the measureability of goods has the same long story as the measurability of the utility itself. For 
example, Euguen Slytsky in his notes on utility stated definitely that goods could be measured either by commercial 
units or units of consumption (Slutsky 2010). 
3 Both ∂l/∂S<0;∂H/∂S<0 values appear in the “common model” of behavior, presented here. The analysis of the 
“leisure model” of behavior (∂L/∂S<-1;∂H/∂S>0), which produces Veblen effect ∂Q/∂H>0;∂Q/∂P>0 (Malakhov 
2015), stays beyond the scope of this paper (S.M.) 
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where w is the wage rate; the value ∂P/∂S<0 measures marginal savings on price per mile under 
the search given by the offer in the car shop; and the value ∂L/∂S<0, the propensity to search,  
represents monetary marginal costs of the search.4  
As the result, when the search is efficient, the choice between bad car Qb and good car Qg 
can be presented as following (Fig. 1): 
−
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Figure 1. Optimal choices for bad car and for good car. 
 
Here we can see that the aged bad car offers low mileage Qb and the good car Qg offers 
high mileage. As a result, the purchase of another car in the case of the choice of the good car 
will come later, or TQg>TQb even when the purchase of the good car presumes its more intensive 
use, sleep less but drive more, or Qg/Hg>Qb/Hb. What happens here with marginal savings? We 
can expect that, if the marginal efficiency of search is diminishing, or ∂2P/∂S2>0, the high price 
for the good car can be resulted in greater marginal benefit, or |∂P/∂S|g>|∂P/∂S|b. But it is not 
true. Indeed, when the trader proposes the important discount for the good car with regard to the 
expected mileage, he offers the discount on the QP value. In our example this discount is equal 
to the value Q∂P/∂S. And in the case of greater discount on a good car we have |Qg∂P/∂SQg|>| 
Qb∂P/∂SQb|. 
                                            
4 The marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, presented in relative values, are equal at the equilibrium to the classical 
relationships MUQ=λP and MUH=λw, presented in absolute values due to the change of the value of Lagrangian, which in this 
model is equal to the marginal utility of wage rate, or λ=MUw(Malakhov 2018). 
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 But on imperfect market the demand for high mileage should cut the price per future 
mile. The price falls with the increase in quantity to be purchased. But this fall is inelastic, or 
eP,Q>-1 because the seller should keep the positive cash inflow.  If the price falls with the 
increase in mileage, in spite of |Qg∂P/∂SQg|>| Qb∂P/∂SQb|, marginal savings per future mile for 
the good car will be less than marginal savings per future mile for the bad car, or 
|∂P/∂S|Qg<|∂P/∂S|Qb. The consideration eP,Q>-1 results in the assumption that marginal savings, 
here we can take an absolute value without the loss in the sense, follows the price, or e|∂P/∂S|,Q>-
1. This assumption results in the north-east shift of the budget constraint at Figure 1. Obviously, 
the good car promises the greater level of utility. 
We see at Figure 1 that under efficient search a consumer can optimize both choices with 
regard to his need in mileage – the purchase of a bad car and the purchase of a good car. But his 
individual marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure MRS (H for 
Q)=Q/(L+S) – tastes and preferences - stays the same for both choices.  
 
Part II. Equilibrium price of one mile. 
However, the everyday shopping passes by the optimization problem. Here the quantity 
demanded Q becomes the constant value and the price reduction ∂P/∂S becomes the variable 
value. Consumers determine quantities to be purchased, as G.Stigler proposed in the original 
equation, and they compare prices under price dispersion. But the analysis of the utility function 
with regard to its constraint gives us a possibility to transform the implicit optimization problem 
(Qvarible;Hvariable;wconst;∂P/∂Sconst) into the explicit consumer choice 
(Qconst;Hvariable;wconst;∂P/∂Svariable). As a result, at the equilibrium the behavioral explicit choice 
matches the optimal implicit solution. 
The transformation of the budget constraint (Equation 2.1.) gives us the concept of the 
equilibrium price under price dispersion: 
w
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e
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We see that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure doesn’t 
depend on the purchase price. The purchase price is different for low-mileage car and high-
mileage car.  But when the consumer chooses between two cars he has the same trade-off 
between consumption and leisure for both options. This is equilibrium price of one mile that is 
equal for both options and makes the choice reliable.5 
If we present the set of equations (3) in the graphical form, we get the following picture 
(Fig.2): 
 
                                            
5 It is easy to demonstrate that from the point of view of home production the equation Pe=w(L+S)/Q=∂w(L+S)/∂Q 
is true, or the equilibrium price is equal to average and marginal costs of home production. 
 5 
S
wL
0
QP
p
QP(S)
QP
e
wL(S)
w
L+S
P
e
T
−Q∂P / ∂S
T
Q=1
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium price dispersion for the quantity demanded. 
 
Here we have the equilibrium price of a mile Pe, the equilibrium expenditures on the 
quantity demanded QPe, the willingness to pay wL0, and the purchase price for the quantity 
demanded QPp. The shape of the expenditures’ curve QP(S) is given by the assumption of the 
diminishing efficiency of search, or ∂2P/∂S2>0, and the shape of the monetary costs’ curve wL(S) 
is derived from the Equation 2.1 as ∂2L/∂S2<0.  
This picture immediately discovers the consumers’ heterogeneity. Indeed, there are 
consumers with zero search costs and consumers with positive search costs (Stahl 1989). 
Consumers with zero search costs, i.e., shoppers, are ready to pay QPe.  Indeed, “the price in the 
high-price stores is the reservation price of shoppers with high willingness to pay, not their 
maximum willingness to pay for the good.” (Diamond 1987, p.434). But consumers with positive 
search costs, i.e., searchers, are ready to pay only wL0 and they finally spend QPp. 
The equilibrium price mechanism works as following. If the consumer decides to stop the 
search on the suboptimal level, he doesn’t equalize marginal costs of search with its marginal 
benefit. The absolute value of marginal loss is less than the marginal gain, or 
w
∂L
∂S
< Q
∂P
∂S
(4.1)
w(L+ S) <QP
e
(4.2)
 
 
The suboptimal purchase results in the low value of total costs of purchase with regard to 
the equilibrium price expenditures. It means that the searcher can re-sell the bought item to the 
shopper (Fig.3).  
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Figure 3. Suboptimal purchase 
If he does it, he immediately switches on the mechanism of Walrasian arbitrage that 
shifts the equilibrium price down until it cleans up suboptimal purchases from the market. The 
market is in the equilibrium when searchers make optimal purchases and their willingness to 
accept or to sell (WTA) is equal to the willingness to pay (WTP) of shoppers. 
Although the resale practice is regulated, the Walrasian arbitrage finds its way because 
producers are looking for shoppers. “When there are enough customers with high willingness to 
pay, we have the emergence of stores specializing in selling to them.” (Diamond, op.cit.) 
Aircraft companies sell fast track services in different ways in order to provide shoppers 
with the right to cut the line. Amusement parks have also started selling the right to jump the 
queue. 
And searchers also follow this practice. The line-standing business where searchers sell 
the right to jump the queue to shoppers has emerged in different areas – from entertainment 
industry to medical services.6 
Coming back to the market of mileage, we can easily discover signals of the Walrasian 
arbitrage. Illegal taxicabs, sometimes known as pirate taxi or gypsy cabs are widespread not only 
in developing, but also, in spite of strict regulations, in developed countries.7 Illegal drivers are 
selling miles to impatient consumers. 
But in order to sell a mile for a shopper, the searcher should fill his car with gas and oil 
and – to drive. He becomes a producer with his car as a major input. The same thing happens in 
the household. The family buys a car in order not to pay the price for a mile in taxi. Other words, 
driving become a specific form of home production. A family faces the traditional option – to 
buy a mile in taxi, or to produce it at home. And while this activity reduces the purchase price, 
here the price of a mile in the taxi, driving takes the form of the search after the purchase. 
Indeed, we can buy the steak in the shop and make a meal – either to consume it, or to sell. It 
means that home production itself becomes a specific form of the search that decreases the 
equilibrium price of the steak in the restaurant. The search costs are divided with regard to the 
purchase between ex ante search costs and ex post search costs.  
The notion of ex post search costs looks invalid but gets sense when we remember that 
we are buying not a car, but expected miles. And from the point of view of consumption cycle 
these ex post costs with regard to the moment of purchase become preparatory ax ante costs –
washing, fueling – now with regard to the moment of following consumption of miles. However, 
                                            
6 Readers can find the brilliant overview of this practice in “What Money Can’t Buy”, written by Michael J.Sandel 
Excerpt, 2012 (http://discourseinprogress.com/what-money-cant-buy/) 
7 “Les taxis clandestins, plaie des aéroports parisiens“ (Le Parisien, le 21 novembre 2018). 
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in order not to put all these costs in the same bundle we use in the static model the notion of ex 
post search costs. 
And we can re-write the Equation 3.2 in the following form: 
 
WTA
searcher
=WTP
shopper
(5.1)
w(L+ S
exante
+ S
ex post
) =QP
e
(5.2)  
But the mile demanded by the shopper is the mile in taxicab where he bears neither ex ante, nor 
ex post search costs. Thus, the equilibrium price for the market, either for lemons, or for new 
cars is the price for a mile in taxicab.  
While the equilibrium price for a mile is unique for these markets, the equilibrium 
expenditures are not. The market establishes different equilibria for expenditures with regard to 
the expected mileage. But the expenditures on expected miles are equal to the price of a car. It 
means that on the surface we get two-price equilibrium for good cars and bad cars.8 
As a result, the choice between two optimums, presented at Figure 1, gets the following 
complete presentation of the equilibrium price dispersion (Fig.4): 
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Figure 4. Optimal expenditures for good car and for bad car 
 
Here we have the equilibrium expenditures QgPe for a good car and QbPe for a bad car, 
the corresponding purchase prices QgPPg and QbPPb, and different time horizons. While 
equilibrium expenditures on the mileage represent the equilibrium price of the car itself, we see 
that under efficient search the automobile market is fragmented by the two-price equilibrium.  
But we should keep in mind that when total expenses on purchase of a bad car are less 
than for a good car the purchase price for a mile in good car is less that the purchase price for a 
mile in a bad car. The decrease in expected mileage raises the purchase price for a mile in a 
bad car till the options to buy or to lease and to rent or to take taxi become reliable. 
 
Part III. Pleasurable search 
We see, that the willingness to pay for the expected mileage wL0 is equal to the 
willingness to pay for the car as well as the purchase piece of the expected mileage QPP is equal 
to the price of this car. It is not the same with the equilibrium price. The willingness to accept or 
                                            
8 The reporting format of this paper limits the review of the voluminous literature on price dispersion, which can be 
found in  “Information, Search, and Price Dispersion” (Baye et al. 2006). 
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to sell QPe is equal not to the willingness to sell the car, but to the willingness to sell expected 
mileage that covers all costs of the mileage to be sold. The willingness to sell the mileage gives 
us the possibility to analyze the structure of these costs. 
If we take driving as a form of home production we accept it as the dual activity.  Driving 
can provide pleasure and sometimes it represents leisure itself. There are some dual activities 
like gardening and pets’ care that can be classified as both leisure and home production because 
these activities provide direct utility but are also something one can purchase on the market 
(Aguiar and Hurst  2007). The last consideration is true for driving, because we can buy miles on 
the market.  
We see that the driving not only reduces transportation expenditures of the family with 
regard to taxi but it can also provide pleasure. Here, the pleasure and savings are not competitive 
goals. But they really become competitive, when the search becomes tedious and it cuts the time 
of leisure enjoyment. 
It seems that all these considerations needs the introduction of search as well as 
opportunity costs of money into the utility function. However, this way increases significantly 
the set of assumptions that result in cumbersome calculations, which immediately appeal to 
Alfred Marshall, who told once, “when a great many symbols have to be used, they become very 
laborious to any one but the writer himself” (Marshall 1920[1890], p.12). The static analysis of 
choice between the good car and the bad car provides enough tools to describe the pleasure of 
search as well the role of the opportunity costs of money, i.e., the interest rate. 
We can presuppose that the opportunity costs of money affect the initial choice of 
expected mileage. When the interest rate is high, the consumer chooses the cheap bad car. When 
the interest rate falls, the consumer can buy the good expensive car. What happens here with the 
allocation of time? The Equations (3.1; 3.2) are true for both choices. It means that the increase 
in the expected mileage Q raises not only the total costs w(L+S) but the absolute value of the 
propensity to search |∂L/∂S|=|-(L+S)/T|. The greater expected mileage needs the greater time 
horizon. But according to the Equation (1.5) the share of leisure time in this new time horizon 
H/T will be less than for the low expected mileage.  
The Equation (1.3) tells us that the share of leisure time exhibits the trade-off between 
leisure and search, or H/T= - ∂H/∂S. It means that the increase in expected mileage changes the 
leisure-search trade-off. 
On the other hand, the constant MRS (H for Q) = w/Pe=Q/(L+S) gives an idea that total 
non-leisure time (L+S) should rise at the same rate with the expected mileage Q. But we know 
that the purchase price of a mile falls with the increase in the expected mileage. It means that the 
price of a car QPP=wL rises slowly, or ∂wL/∂Q>0 but ∂
2
wL/∂Q
2
<0 and ∂2L/∂Q2 <0. And in 
order to keep the value of MRS (H for Q) constant we should increase the time of search faster, 
or ∂2S/∂Q2 >0. These considerations discover the re-allocation of time under increase in mileage. 
The increase in the expected mileage takes place when opportunity costs of money, i.e., 
marginal utility of real balances, are low. In addition, the increase in the expected mileage cuts 
the marginal utility of a mile. But under the constant MRS (H for Q) it means, that the marginal 
utility of leisure also falls. Indeed, while the share of leisure in the time horizon falls with 
increase in the expected mileage, the amount of leisure time rises. We can expect that the 
marginal utility of leisure follows the marginal utility of real balances. At the margins, for low 
expected mileage under high opportunity costs of money the search cuts significantly labor and 
keeps leisure almost untouched and for the great mileage under low opportunity costs of money 
the search substitutes primarily leisure time, keeping here labor time almost untouched. 
The traditional consumption-leisure optics can tell us that this phenomenon takes place 
because low mileage complements leisure, while high mileage substitutes it. But this way needs 
the re-consideration of the constant MRS (H for Q) that could be true with the constant 
equilibrium price Pe only with the change in the wage rate w that makes senseless the initial 
problem of the choice between a good car and a bad car. Nevertheless, the idea of 
complementarity/substitutability finds its way, here with regard to the search. Low-mileage 
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choice tells us that search and leisure are complements, while for a good car the search starts to 
substitute leisure. The search becomes pleasurable.  
It might become pleasurable even before the purchase. The idea to buy a good car can 
make pleasurable the journey across the Rhine, like looking at windows in the downtown makes 
evening promenades more pleasurable. 
And it keeps its pleasure after the purchase. By the driving the consumer makes efforts to 
derive utility from the mileage, like by the lawn mowing he makes efforts to derive utility from 
the garden. Both activities might be pleasurable. 
But if the driving of a good car is pleasurable, it substitutes primarily leisure time, 
keeping labor time almost untouched. It means that the purchase price of high-mileage good car 
doesn’t fall significantly with regard to the initial WTP=wL0, or wL=QPP≈wL0. The possibility 
to substitute leisure by driving, i.e., search ex post, reduces bargain efforts with regard to the 
high willingness to pay for high-expected-mileage car. 
On the other hand, we can expect tough bargaining for the purchase of the low-mileage 
bad car because there the search is the real necessity that cut primarily labor time. This 
conclusion looks like a paradox. And it was really described like the paradox of little pre-
purchase search for big-ticket items (Grewal and Marmorstein 1994), which illustrated the 
satisficing approach to the purchase of durables (Kapteyn at al. 1979). In addition, R.Thaler 
presented that paradox like an anomaly: 
“One application of marginal analysis is optimal search. Search for the lowest price 
should continue until the expected marginal gain equals the value of the search costs. This is 
likely to be violated if the context of the search influences the perception of the value of the 
savings. In Thaler (1980), I argued that individuals were more likely to spend 20 minutes to save 
$5 on the purchase of a $25 clock radio than to save the same amount on the purchase of a $500 
television.” (Thaler 1987, pp.110-111). 
This so-called “anomaly” was explained once by the simple mathematics of the model of 
search, presented here (Malakhov 2015). Here we get an additional confirmation of the validity 
of the marginal approach to the analysis of search. But the effect of pleasurable search in the 
choice of a car is not limited by driving. It increases the general readiness of customers to bear 
after-purchase costs and results in the willingness to take care of good big-ticket items. 
 
 
Part IV. Willingness to take care 
 
The re-allocation of time under increase in expected mileage discovers the asymmetry of 
labor and search costs per mile.  
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We see that search costs per mile in the good car Qg are greater than in the bad car Qb. If 
we follow the conclusion that the cheap car takes more pre-purchase search than the expensive 
car, we get ex post search costs per mile in the good car much greater than in the bad car. 
Moreover, if we omit the assumption of the asymmetry of the pre-purchase search and take it 
proportional to the expected mileage, we get ex post search cost per mile still greater for the 
good car: 
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One of the possible explanations of this asymmetry is the change in the manner of 
driving. We can presuppose that the driving in the good car is more careful and it needs more 
attention and more efforts. But it is not enough to explain the asymmetry of ex post search costs 
per mile. It is well known that old car with limited expected mileage needs more technological 
maintenance. Other words, technological maintenance costs rise exponentially with the age of a 
car (Lapasinskaite and Boguslauskas 2005). If it is true, it means that after-purchase costs per 
mile, mean or average, should be greater for the bad car.  
The opposite effect presumes that there some other ex post costs above technological 
maintenance costs. And we can derive them very illustratively, if we take total expected after-
purchase costs, divide them by the expected mileage and get the wSex post(Q) function. Then we 
deduct technological maintenance costs MC(Q) and find very specific costs that we can describe 
as the costs of the willingness to take care of good car WTC(Q) (Figure 5): 
wS
expost
,WTC,MC
MC
WTC
Q,T
wS
expost
Figure 5. The costs of the willingness to take care 
We see that at the beginning of the product lifecycle the costs of willingness to take care 
exceed the costs of technological maintenance. But once these costs become negative. It happens 
when we stop to think about clean shoes when we get into the car and we stop to drive slowly 
before the relantisseurs. Other words, the willingness to take care becomes negative, when we 
begin to use the car carelessly that increases costs of technological maintenance. 
Mathematically, the WTC doesn’t appear when pre-purchase costs for a good car are 
disproportionally high. But this assumption doesn’t look plausible with regard to the product 
lifecycle, when time of use by definition is significantly greater than the time of search. 
The phenomenon of the willingness to take care seems to be universal for durables, 
especially in housing, where new furniture is cleaning frequently. Of course, it needs more 
profound both psychological and economic analysis. But even here it is evident that the 
willingness to take care is tied with the pleasurable search, i.e., dual activity of home production 
that can be also treated as leisure. The pleasurable search works like a vehicle for the willingness 
to take care. And when the pleasurable search decreases primarily leisure, leaving labor almost 
untouched, or QPP=wL≈wL0=WTP, we can say that the willingness to take care supports the 
willingness to pay. 
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However, the WTC makes a part of the total wS costs that create the difference between 
the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept or to sell. Here we come to the problem of 
the WTP-WTA gap. While the literature on this subject is very voluminous, we concentrate the 
analysis on the particular optics of the endowment effect because the model presented here 
challenges this concept of the prospect theory. Here we see that the WTP-WTA gap is produced 
by search costs. The idea of the endowment effect is based on the specific utility function of the 
prospect theory, where individuals evaluate their gains and losses asymmetrically (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). The experimental trading of tokens and Cornell coffee mugs discovered the 
important difference between the willingness to pay and the willingness to sell. According to the 
theoretical conclusion, that disparity had been produced by the endowment effect, or the feeling 
of possession (Kahneman et al. 1990). The idea of the willingness to take care flourishes on the 
same ground. While the experimental tests of WTP-WTA gap pretended to refute the theorem of 
Coase, we proceed to the study of the willingness to take with regard to this theorem and 
introduce into the analysis of the choice between two cars the externality of the dust and the 
externality of the odometer fraud. 
 
Part V. The willingness to take care under the theorem of Coase 
 
In 2004 R.Meyer asked 87 business students to evaluate two scenarios of cleaning the 
large stain on $1500 couch  – to invite a professional furniture restorer for $195 or to clean the 
couch themselves with a mix of commercial cleansers for $30. In the case where the couch was 
brand-new, 62% of students preferred the expensive repair and 38% preferred the less-expensive 
option. But when the couch was described as being five years old, only 44% opted for the 
expensive repair. (Meyer 2004). 
The information on car maintenance is enormously voluminous and there are many 
factors – brand, age, insurance – that vary over the statistical data. If we choose there the average 
age of vehicle fleet, which is taken as one of key external drivers for car wash and detailing 
services industry, we can find that «consumers are more likely to get new vehicles professionally 
washed and detailed, preferring to keep their new high-value purchases in perfect condition. 
When the average age of the vehicle fleet declines, the composition of vehicles on the road 
trends towards newer cars, meaning more consumers can be expected to use the industry’s 
services.» (Whytcross 2015, p.5). 
Washing and cleaning represent the willingness of consumers to take care of their cars 
with regard to the externality of dust. Buying a good car, we are ready to keep it clean just at the 
moment of purchase. But washing and cleaning are common in the presale preparation. And this 
fact tells us that the willingness to take care contributes to the negotiation between seller and 
buyer.  
The problem of odometer fraud is more sophisticated but it serves like a good illustration 
for the theorem of lemons. 
In March 2018 le Centre des Consommateurs, published the review “Car-Pass or how to 
be sure of a vehicle’s mileage”: 
“According to the European Parliament ”studies estimate the share of tampered vehicles 
between 5 % and 12 % of used cars in national sales and between 30 % and 50 % in cross- 
border sales, accumulating to a total economic damage between EUR 5,6 and 9,6 billion in the 
whole Union.”  The manipulation of mileage meters is widespread for example in Germany 
where it affects more than 1 out of every 3 vehicles and causes approx. 6 billion euros worth of 
damage per year. This practice in Germany is especially harmful to the many foreign consumers 
who cross the Rhine to find the car of their dreams.”  
Buying a good car, we can ask the seller all documentation on technological maintenance 
in order to confirm the state of the vehicle. Here the problem of WTC appears. These costs are 
not documented. The seller could pass the relentisseurs slowly to prevent the damage of shock 
absorbers. But the fact that shock absorbers have not been replaced for years can produce the 
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opposite effect and the buyer can deduct the costs of shock absorbers’ replacement from the 
purchase price. If he doesn’t, an economist tells that here the positive externality of trust works 
(Arrow 1985).  But we think that the solution lies much deeper. The consumer is neither naïve, 
nor blind. But, being fascinated by the car of his dreams, the buyer is ready to bear costs of the 
externality of hidden defects like he is ready to bear costs of the externality of the dust. Of 
course, everything has its price and the willingness to take is not unlimited. But the answer of the 
seller to question about the state of shock absorbers – if you brake before the relentisseurs, they 
will serve another couple of years – satisfies the buyer not only because he trusts in it, but 
because seller’s answer just corresponds to his idea how he will take care of the car and how he 
will drive it. 
This simple reasoning challenges the following conclusion of the prospect theory: 
“According to the Coase theorem, the allocation of resources to individuals who can 
bargain and transact at no cost should be independent of initial property rights. However, if the 
marginal rate of substitution between one good and another is affected by endowment, then the 
individual who is assigned the property right to a good will be more likely to retain it.” 
(Kahneman et al. op.cit., pp.1339-1340). 
Here the authors express doubts in the so-called “invariance hypothesis” of the theorem 
of Coase (Medema and Zerba 2000, Encyclopedia of Law&Economics, p.838). But we can see 
that at any moment of its lifecycle the equilibrium price of a car is equal to its expected mileage 
times the equilibrium price of a mile in taxi, or QPe. It means that for the expected mileage the 
equilibrium price of the traded car stays the same whether it is sold or not. Thus, the final 
allocation of resources is invariant under alternative assignment of property rights. The market 
keeps the expected mileage in any way.  
The WTA of expected mileage is a good starting point to understand the reservation price 
of the seller. It corresponds to the actual state of the car, carefully used before. The sale 
redistributes expected costs of driving and maintenance to the new customer. The problem 
appears with WTC costs, which are individual. That’s why the best moment to sell happens when 
WTC costs of the car’s owner like transaction costs in the standard Coasean analysis become 
equal to zero. Here, the seller, who doesn’t calculate theoretical marginal values, but who knows 
perfectly his car, behaves as if he subtracts from the equilibrium price predictable driving and 
necessary maintenance costs and gets his reservation price. Here, the problem of the ex ante MC 
technological costs appears, because the seller wants to recover it. But it doesn’t mean that he is 
sunk-costs’ sensitive. While the trade-off between the ex ante WTC and ex post MC 
technological costs always exists, the important ex ante WTC costs reduce ex post MC 
technological costs, and the reservation price as the value, net form driving and maintenance 
costs, will be higher. And when a potential buyer has positive WTC, his enthusiasm to cut labor 
costs, i.e., the purchase price wL=QPP, will be limited by the pleasurable search, and 
wL=QPP≈wL0=WTP.  
The “as if” assumption works also against the odometer fraud. The important discount, 
proposed often by unfair sellers, with regard to the willingness to pay for a good car usually 
creates doubts in the real state of the car and its lifecycle. If the consumer rejects this 
advantageous offer, he behaves as if he is rational because under the unique equilibrium price 
Pe=-T∂P/∂S the greater absolute value of the price reduction per mile |∂P/∂S| means the short 
time horizon T. Like all assumptions of this kind, here the “as if” hypothesis also hasn’t the 
absolute power, but it diminishes significantly the negative effect of the odometer fraud. 
But if there is no odometer fraud, i.e., if standard Coasean transaction costs are equal to 
zero, the new owner of the car, if he starts to sell the mileage, adds to the purchase price 
expected costs of driving, care, and maintenance in order to get his willingness to sell, which 
again will be equal to the equilibrium price QPe. Here we don’t suppose that tastes and 
preferences of the buyer and seller are identical. But, as we can see, a trade-off between purchase 
price, costs of driving, care and maintenance with regard to habits, i.e., driving manner usually 
exists. Paying less, the new mileage’s seller, or the taxi driver will bear more WTC costs, for 
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example, to make the cab more comfortable in order to stay competitive and to sell the mileage 
to shoppers. 
We see that on the theoretical basis the analysis presented here confirms the theorem of 
Coase. If the seller has zero WTC costs and the buy has positive WTC costs, the asset, here the 
good car, is redistributed for its more efficient use, regardless how initial property rights have 
been assigned, as it is stated by the “efficiency hypothesis” of the theorem of Coase (Medema 
and Zerba 2000, op.cit). Moreover, this is the WTC phenomenon, which enables the efficiency of 
the transaction. 
The sale of the bad car, when the search, i.e., driving, looses its pleasure and the WTC 
becomes negative, illustrates the other side of the problem and explains also the results of the 
experimental tests of the endowment effect. Usually the tough bargaining concentrates on the 
technological maintenance costs, incurred by the seller, i.e., wSex ante costs, which are included by 
the buyer in his willingness to sell the car. When coffee mugs didn’t presume the pleasurable 
search, the buyers cut their willingness to pay, like it happens with bad cars. And the WTP-WTA 
gap appears, here due to the reluctance to buy. 
The reluctance to sell also might be explained by the search model, presented here. 
According to the model, the willingness to accept is equal to the willingness to pay only between 
shoppers, i.e., consumers with zero search costs. And the participants in the experiments were 
searchers. Although the costs of transactions in those experiments had been artificially 
eliminated, the search costs, here, the costs of decision-making, stayed positive. When the 
milkman appears at the door unexpectedly, the hostess should decide whether to accept his price 
or to go the store. The authors of those experiments discovered partly that problem, when they 
analyzed not only the reluctance to sell, but also the reluctance to buy. However, the upgrade of 
the experiment with Cornell coffee mugs by the option to keep the mug and take it home, had 
not facilitated the decision but made it more difficult, because it enlarged the optics of possible 
outcomes. The decision-making to buy or not to buy a big-ticket item can take days and weeks. 
The coffee mugs are not big-ticket items, but it doesn’t mean that the decision efforts, even the 
answers to the questions – is it a need a want, can we wait, is it an impulse buy, will we actually 
use it, if somebody were to give us cash, will we take that instead - i.e., their ex ante search costs 
are equal to zero. While the ex post costs in those experiments could be taken as zero search 
costs, the costs of decision-making could not. 
This interpretation of the WTP-WTA gap corresponds to the results of the other 
experimental trading with coffee mugs, which challenged the WTP-WTA disparity (Plott and 
Zeiler 2005). Moreover, “the comparative experiments demonstrate that WTP-WTA gaps are 
indeed sensitive to experimental procedures. By implementing different procedures, the 
phenomenon can be turned on and of.” (Plott and Zeiler, op.cit., p.542). In general, “a review of 
the literature reveals that WTP-WTA gaps are nor reliably observed across experimental 
designs”, and if it appears, it might be explained, “that responses in experiments reflect a type of 
internal search process in which subjects use paid practice rounds along with trial and error to 
“discover” what their preferences are.” (op.cit., p.543). 
 
Conclusion 
The paper presents a study of the marginal scenario of the theorem of lemons when the 
hypothetical market failure takes place and nobody buys cars but everybody gets taxi. This 
marginal scenario opens the way for the analysis of the demand for mileage. This analysis 
discovers the psycho-economical need of consumers to take care of big-ticket items, here the 
cars with high expected mileage, after the purchase. The willingness to take care supports the 
demand for good cars and enables the redistribution of used cars for its more efficient use. 
The paper doesn’t enlarge the analysis of the asymmetry of information and it uses here 
only the framework of the theorem of lemons. Nevertheless, the idea of zero willingness to take 
care can contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of moral hazard. 
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However, the hypothesis of the existence of the willingness to take care needs its 
verification otherwise than by field studies. If economists and psychologists accept this 
hypothesis, they should take care of the methodology of field studies, especially of the 
experimental design in order not to get the desired confusion. 
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